

VZCZCXRO2210
OO RUEHCI
DE RUEHKT #3274/01 3560655
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 220655Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4288
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 5185
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 5451
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 0623
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 3453
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4814
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0734
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA PRIORITY 2955
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1405
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2278
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 003274

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2016

TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [NP](#) [UN](#)

SUBJECT: U.S., UK, INDIA, AND THE UN DIALOGUE ON SECURITY
CHALLENGES AND POLICE SUPPORT

REF: KATHMANDU 3217

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nicholas J. Dean. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary

1. (C) In a December 19 dialogue on security challenges and police support, the U.S. and UK Ambassadors and Ian Martin, the UN's Secretary General's Personal Representative to Nepal, agreed that improved security across the countryside in the next six to eight months would be vital for reducing intimidation by Maoists in the lead-up to Constituent Assembly elections. In a follow-on discussion with Ambassador Moriarty on December 20, Indian Ambassador Mukherjee said one of his top priorities was promoting the re-establishment of police posts. All shared information on planned priorities/programs to support the police. Martin said the UN's technical assessment report would request eight police advisors to assist with election security as part of the UN's wider election and monitoring mandates. The Ambassadors and Martin agreed to stay in touch as their plans for police support and security sector reform developed.

Local Security Urgently Needed for Free and Fair Elections

2. (C) In a dialogue on security challenges and police support December 19 between Ambassador Moriarty, UK Ambassador Andrew Hall, and Ian Martin, the UN's Secretary General's Personal Representative to Nepal, all expressed shared concern that provision of local security in the lead-up to elections had to be addressed urgently. If Constituent Assembly elections were to be held in June or shortly thereafter free from fear and intimidation, all agreed, the police had to re-establish their presence across the countryside. During the session, which Ambassador Moriarty convened to encourage complementary approaches between the U.S., the UK, India and the UN in policing and security sector reform, participants agreed that civilian leadership, namely the Home Ministry, had to be pushed to provide stronger direction and support to the police force. Ambassador Moriarty provided a read-out of the session on December 20 to Indian Ambassador Shiv Mukherjee who voiced similar priorities. Despite clear language in the November

21 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and November 28 Agreement on the Management of Arms and Armies, Maoists continued to interfere with the reinstatement of police posts, Ambassador Moriarty noted.

U.S. Plans

13. (C) Ambassador Moriarty reiterated the U.S. belief that the next six to eight months, preceding Constituent Assembly elections and in their immediate aftermath, was a narrow window of opportunity to put Nepal on a peaceful and democratic path. The Ambassador told the other envoys that he had sent a request to Washington for additional funds needed during this timeframe for election support and provision of local security and governance. The Ambassador said that because of the terrorist designation, the U.S. was restricted in engaging the Maoists and was unable to support the cantonment process. Our value-added could be in promoting improved security and governance at the local level. The Ambassador also noted our newly-arrived Department of Justice police advisor, who had a six-month assignment to help the Nepali police with long-term strategic planning. He also described ongoing U.S. training opportunities for the police and an August seminar on security sector reform that had included police participants.

UK Plans

14. (C) UK Ambassador Hall said that public safety and security was one of the UK's top priorities for peace process

KATHMANDU 00003274 002 OF 003

support. He mentioned the UK's history of support to the police, referencing former UK police advisor, Richard Miles. Ambassador Hall said that, in the near-term, the UK planned to shepherd all support through the Ministry of Finance's Peace Fund. However, the UK would be deploying a small assessment team the last week of January and first week of February to determine possible UK support to the police for election security and mid- to long-term support for police reform and security sector reform. (Note: In subsequent discussions with Emboff, a UK aid official said they would likely provide general budget support to the police over a five- to seven- year timeframe to implement a "reform-minded" strategic plan. End note.)

UN Plans

15. (C) The UN Secretary General's Personal Representative to Nepal, Ian Martin, said he hoped his mission would be able to include a small number of police advisors (eight or more) to assist at the national and regional level on election security. Martin said the technical assessment mission from New York that had just left Kathmandu would include a recommendation for police advisors in its final report to the Secretary General. He emphasized that this would be a

SIPDIS

short-term assignment in the lead-up to the election to bolster the police, and would be tied to the UN's broader election and monitoring mandates. Additionally, he hoped to deploy civil affairs personnel to complement military arms monitors to look at issues such as local governance, security, and policing. However, in a clear reference to India, Martin expressed concern that some member states might see the police advisory support as "mission creep." Martin also wondered what the Home Ministry and Maoist reaction would be to such a proposal. Ambassador Moriarty recommended to Martin that he couch the request as having a focused timeframe and limited mandate for election security planning.

Indian Plans

¶6. (C) Indian Ambassador Mukherjee said encouraging local security and an expanded police presence in the countryside in the lead-up to elections was one of his top priorities. He said he planned to press the Home Ministry and Prime Minister to insist on the re-opening of police posts and to provide stronger direction and support to the police. Ambassador Mukherjee said the Indians had paid for 250 vehicles and USD 12 million in communications equipment requested by the police. The package is due to arrive in three weeks. The Indians also continued to offer extensive training opportunities for the police.

Political Will Needed to Empower the Police

¶7. (C) Ambassador Moriarty, Ambassador Hall, and Martin expressed concern that the civilian leadership lacked political will to empower the police. They speculated that the Home Ministry and police were nervous to act without Maoist buy-in. Ambassador Moriarty said the Maoists were unlikely and unmotivated to support an increased police presence because it would limit their freedom of action. In follow-on discussions, Ambassador Mukherjee said that, during recent travel outside of Kathmandu, he had witnessed a police force even more paralyzed than in recent months ("more pugnacious in their refusal to work"). One police leader in the east told him that the police were frightened to act against the Maoists because they still worried the Maoists would take over the government and soon be their "bosses." The UK Department for International Development's Alan Whaites, who accompanied Ambassador Hall, commented that in his consultations thus far with the police they seemed open to support and reform. The challenge, he emphasized, was the political will from civilian leadership to move forward. Martin agreed that the blockages to a reinvigorated police presence were "from above." Ambassador Moriarty, Ambassador

KATHMANDU 00003274 003 OF 003

Hall, and Martin agreed that the Indians had the greatest ability to discuss frankly the need for civilian leadership to empower and direct the police to stand up to Maoist interference. The envoys also discussed coordinating messaging on policing in support of India's lead.

More Communication Needed

¶8. (C) The UK Ambassador also cited a lack of communication between the Home Ministry, security forces and the Election Commission on plans for election security. Whaites said the police, in their election security planning, assumed that the election process would be phased, thus requiring less manpower across the country. However, the Election Commission was no longer considering a phased election but rather a one-day event. Whaites said a country-wide election on one day would require 65,000 police. Additional auxiliary officers would have to be added to the existing police force to reach these numbers. The group discussed ways to encourage better intra-Nepali Government communication.

Trade-Off: Short-Term Security Needs and Longer-Term Reform

¶9. (SBU) Martin raised the trade-off between bringing new recruits quickly into the police force to address urgent needs and the mid- to long-term project of reforming Nepal's security institutions. The U.S. and UK Ambassadors agreed that a longer project of reform would need to be designed. Ambassador Moriarty, however, stressed that the next six to eight months had to be prioritized in order to make wider reform efforts possible.

Comment

¶10. (C) The meetings were a good start to a dialogue between the U.S., India, the UK, and the UN on policing and security sector reform issues. It is reassuring that these actors recognized the urgent need for re-establishment of police presence. The U.S. should support the UN Mission's bid to include police advisors within its mandate. However, near-term contributions to the police are still paltry. Eight UN police advisors, UK budget support to the peace fund, and an Indian equipment package will not end the paralysis of the police across the country, overcome Maoist interference with establishment of police posts, or ensure elections are free from intimidation. We will continue to work with the Indians, the UK and the UN to deliver parallel messages encouraging the Home Ministry to give the needed mandate and direction to its police force. We will also continue to explore avenues for supporting police planning and presence for election security (reftel).
DEAN